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Abstract
This article argues that interventions in HRE and PE that aim to decolonize
understandings and praxes of peace and human rights will inevitably have to
address the issue of decolonial ethics. Decolonial ethics imagines a set of
ethical orientations that confront conventional assumptions about culture
and history and challenge the normally uninterrogated consequences of
coloniality (which is an enduring process that is still very much with us today,
as opposed to colonialism which is understood as a temporal period of
oppression that has come and gone) and Eurocentrism in disciplinary
discourses and practices. Although both HRE and PE have historically
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claimed an ethical mission that has attempted in the past to articulate
responses to the ethical problem of how to struggle against violations of
rights and to reinstate respect and protection of rights and positive peace in
the world, both conventional and progressive approaches have been generally
unreflective about the ethical implications of coloniality and Eurocentrism in
these fields. The article explores how decolonial reflections on ethics sketch a
different path in HRE and PE from the familiar ethical theories along three
directions: border thinking, being human as praxis, and pluriversality.
Keywords: Decolonial; Ethics; Human Rights Education; Peace Education;
Pedagogy

R

ecent work in Human Rights Education (HRE) and Peace Education
(PE) has begun to critique coloniality and Eurocentrism, unmasking
how these maladies are implicated in un-critical, monolithic,
depoliticized and largely de-contextualized manifestations of HRE and PE
(e.g. see Bajaj, 2015; Bajaj & Brantmeier, 2011; Keet, 2015; Kester, 2019; Shirazi,
2011; Williams, 2013, 2016, 2017; Yang, 2015; Zakharia 2017; Zembylas, 2017a,
2017b, 2018). This work has drawn attention to a range of exclusions,
epistemic injustices and other violences in HRE and PE, and to a failure to
fully address issues of power, race, and coloniality. Some of the critiques and
counter-projects that have been raised against coloniality and Eurocentrism
draw inspiration from decolonial thinking, highlighting how a ‘colonial
matrix of power’ systematically reproduces colonial patterns of racial
domination, epistemic hierarchization, and marginalization of non-Western
knowledges and lifeworlds in wide-ranging academic fields. Scholars such as
Enrique Dussel (1985, 2013), Walter Mignolo (2000, 2011), Nelson MaldonadoTorres (2007, 2008), Sylvia Wynter (2003; Wynter & McKittrick, 2015), and
others, have turned our attention to the deep influence of taken-for-granted
epistemological, ontological, methodological, and ethical assumptions
embedded within academic disciplines, and particularly the determining
force of historical and contemporary relations of colonialism and coloniality
to the most basic understandings and praxes of knowledge production
(Fregoso Bailón & De Lissovoy, 2018).
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This article argues that a fundamental part of the ongoing project of
decolonization in academia is the task of developing decolonial ethics
(Dussel, 1985, 2013; Maldonado-Torres, 2007, 2008). Decolonial ethics does
not simply recognize the values of intercultural dialogue and cultural
differences, as liberal, multiculturalist, and cosmopolitan orientations
emphasize. Rather, decolonial ethics imagines a set of ethical orientations
that confront conventional assumptions about culture and history and
challenge the normally uninterrogated consequences of coloniality and
Eurocentrism in disciplinary discourses and practices. In this sense, the task
of developing a decolonial ethics is essentially a project of unworking the
ethics of coloniality and Eurocentrism within disciplines (Odysseos, 2017).
Therefore, decolonial ethics is distinct from, and critical of, the ethics
implied in liberal, multiculturalist, and cosmopolitan orientations that
circulate in many fields, including HRE and PE. Decolonial ethics may share
with these orientations a refusal to circumscribe normative commitments to
knowledge, politics and culture, yet it differs from them by virtue of rejecting
fundamental principles of Western notions such as ‘individualism’ and
‘universality’ in favor of other values such as ‘border thinking’ and
‘pluriversality’ (Dunford, 2017). Border thinking highlights the contributions
of subaltern knowledge producers, who are in the ‘borders’ or ‘margins,’
whereas pluriversality emphasizes that there are pluriversal values, that is,
values which emerge from dialogue across multiple places, cultures and
visions about the world.
I argue, then, that interventions in HRE and PE that aim to decolonize
understandings and praxes of peace and human rights will inevitably have to
address the question of decolonial ethics. However, as Odysseos (2017)
emphasizes, this task will not be accomplished by “incorporating elements of
decolonial critique or ‘translating’ these important attempts at decolonial
ethics into our familiar ethical theories” (p. 449). Rather, if we want to retain
“decolonial thought’s disruption of prevalent figurations, languages and ways
of thinking about ‘ethics” (Odysseos, 2017, p. 449), we would need to create a
new language of ethics—a language that moves beyond Eurocentric ethical
theories and emerges from within the experience of the ‘colonial wound’
(Mignolo, 2005), a language that enables envisioning new social and political
3

imaginaries to the ethical problem of how to struggle against violations of
rights and to reinstate respect and protection of rights and positive peace in
the world, while coloniality still persists. Although both HRE and PE have
historically claimed an ethical mission that has attempted in the past to
articulate responses to the ethical problem of togetherness in the world, both
conventional and even more progressive approaches that fall within critical
HRE and critical PE, have been generally unreflective about the ethical
implications of coloniality and Eurocentrism in these fields.
This article seeks to outline some elements of a future decolonial
ethics in HRE and PE, while showing the limits of familiar ethical theories,
namely, liberal, multiculturalist, and cosmopolitan orientations. The aim is
not to provide a comprehensive description of decolonial ethics in HRE and
PE, as this would not only be impossible, but it would risk repeating the same
colonizing moves that are driven by currently dominant ontological,
epistemological and ethical investments in universality, certainty, and
mastery (Stein, 2019). As Dunford (2017) emphasizes, “an exhaustive and
definitive statement of decolonial ethics […] would be impossible, for
decolonial ethics has emerged from, and must remain open to being shaped
by, dialogues amongst millions of grassroots actors and activists” (p. 381).
When understood in this form, decolonial ethics provides an ethical lens for
HRE and PE to continually challenge the enduring legacies of coloniality and
Eurocentrism in these fields.
The article is divided into four sections. In the first section, I outline
some general contours of decolonial critiques that highlight the
distinctiveness of coloniality’s ethics. The second section shows how the
ethics of coloniality is reflected in the engagement with understandings of
peace and human rights theories and pedagogies. The third section turns to
the work of decolonial scholars Enrique Dussel, Sylvia Wynter and Nelson
Maldonado-Torres and critically engages with their ideas on decolonial
ethics; in particular, my analysis addresses the idea of ethics of materiality,
positionality and corporality, the critique of ethical subjectivity found in
European epistemes, and the critique of the Eurocentric paradigm of war,
since I find these issues to be pertinent in the fields of HRE and PE. The final
section explores how these decolonial reflections on ethics sketch a different
4

path in HRE and PE from the familiar ethical theories along three important
directions: border thinking, being human as praxis, and pluriversality. This
section also discusses the tensions and possibilities emerging from attempts
to develop a decolonial ethics in HRE and PE, arguing that the project of
renewing HRE and PE is inextricably linked to the ethical dimensions of
decolonization.
The Ethics of Coloniality
Decolonial thinking consists of a diverse set of critiques of colonialism
and its aftermath—the coloniality of power and knowledge, land
appropriation, racial hierarchization and exclusion, liberal individualism, and
claims of universality (e.g. Dussel, 2013; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Mignolo,
2011; Quijano, 2007; Wynter, 2003).1 Key to this ‘colonial matrix of power’
(Quijano, 2007) are particular Western values such as civilization,
development and liberalism, “that have been imposed on others as universal
and globally applicable designs” (Dunford, 2017, p. 382). As various
decolonial scholars argued, the colonial matrix of power rested on the racial
classification of the world, capitalism as a violent mode of production, the
exploitation of colonized populations, and the expropriation of non-Western
religions, knowledges and cultures. As mentioned earlier, it would be

1

It is important to clarify from the beginning that there are distinctive features that
distinguish decolonial theories from postcolonialism and other critical theories (NdlovuGatsheni, 2015). A similar argument has been made in the field of education, namely, it has
been argued that decolonial and postcolonial perspectives are not necessarily equivalent,
complementary or even supplementary to critical theory and pedagogy projects
(Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2012; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Discussing these theoretical differences
lies beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to say here that the decolonial turn
encourages re-thinking the world from the perspective of the marginalized, that is, from
Latin America, from Africa, from Indigenous places and from the global South. While
postcolonial theory—as it is exemplified, for example, in the work of Said and Spivak—has
exposed Eurocentrism, decolonial theory presents a much more radical position that
critiques the epistemological, ontological and ethical roots of coloniality. I come back to
this issue, when I discuss the distinction between postcolonial manifestations of HRE or PE
and a decolonial ethics in these fields.
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impossible to capture in this section the diversity and complexity of
decolonial thinking, therefore, I will focus on outlining three general
contours of decolonial critiques that, in my view, highlight the
distinctiveness of coloniality’s ethics: coloniality as an enduring process that
claims the superiority of colonialism’s achievements; coloniality as
constitutive of liberal values; and, coloniality as bound up with Eurocentric
knowledge and the epistemicide of colonized subjects’ knowledge. This
discussion provides vital background for understanding decolonial ethics.
First, it is important to clarify that coloniality in general refers to “the
continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial
administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the
modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system” (Grosfoguel, 2007, p.
219). In other words, coloniality is a political, economic, racial and ethical
system of classification and domination. As Maldonado-Torres (2007)
emphasizes, there is an important distinction between coloniality and
colonialism:
Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a
political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation
or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such
nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing
patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that
define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge
production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations.
Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in
books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns,
in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self,
and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as
modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.
(p. 243)
The main point here is that coloniality is an enduring process that claims the
superiority of colonialism’s achievements and the inferiority of conquered
populations—hence, the colonial matrix of power invokes a particular system
of ethics. For example, the coloniality of power—manifested through the
concentration in Europe of capital, the dispossession of lands, enslavement
6

and gendered violence—naturalizes Europe’s politics and culture through its
“non-ethics of war” (Maldonado-Torres, p. 247). As Maldonado-Torres (2007)
explains, the non-ethics of war refers to the idea that war is exempt from the
ethics that regulate normal conduct in majority Christian countries, in favor
of naturalizing violence and slavery justified by virtue of the conquered
populations’ ‘race.’
Second, coloniality is constitutive of liberal values and Western
democratic political institutions (Dunford, 2017). As Maldonado-Torres
(2007) writes about Mignolo’s (2003) notion of coloniality as ‘the darker side
of modernity’:
Modernity, usually considered to be a product of the European
Renaissance or the European Enlightenment, has a darker side,
which is constitutive of it. Modernity as a discourse and as a practice
would not be possible without coloniality, and coloniality continues
to be an inevitable outcome of modern discourses. (p. 244)
Modern discourses of liberal rights, in particular rights to private property,
can be traced in the politics of colonialism and the economic growth of
Europe enabled by colonialism that has led to a wider distribution of
property (Jahn, 2013). As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) explains:
The darker or underside of modernity included the slave trade,
fratricidal colonial wars of conquest, negative development, violent
civilizing missions, forcible Christianization, material dispossessions
and other forms of violence. The brighter side of modernity included
the flowering of individual liberties, universal suffrage, mass
democracy, secularization and emancipation of the masses from the
tyranny of tradition and religion, rationality and scientific spirit,
popular education, technology and many other accomplishments
(Boron, 2005, p. 32). But for one to experience the darker or brighter
aspects of modernity depended on which side of the abyssal lines
one was located as well as the racial category into which one was
classified. (p. 25)
Needless to say, the so-called ‘brighter side of modernity’ is not without
caveats. Individual liberties come sometimes at the cost of collective
struggles; mass democracy is turning into the tyranny of the majority; the
7

assumed emancipation of tradition and religion is leading to Islamophobia;
popular education assumes that other types of education are not relevant.2 In
short, coloniality is inextricably linked to liberal-democratic values and
institutions in Europe, hence the ethico-political foundations of European
values—e.g. private property, tolerance, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism,
individual rights, human rights and so on—were borne out of the colonial
experience. As De Lissovoy (2010) points out, the principle of coexistence is a
fundamental ethical value of coloniality “in which the radical differences
between hegemonic and indigenous standpoints are not suppressed” (p. 282).
However, the hypocrisy is that coexistence is manifested through “the
appropriation of indigenous lands, resources, knowledge and culture within a
colonial dynamic” (De Lissovoy, p. 282). For example, the ideals of peace,
democracy and human rights that are dominant in the twenty-first century,
have all been imposed by violence under the rhetoric of modernity’s
superiority over non-Europeans’ inferiority (Grosfoguel, 2007).
Third, coloniality is bound up with Eurocentric knowledge and the
epistemicide of colonized subjects’ knowledge. The concept of ‘coloniality of
knowledge’ (Quijano, 2007) refers to how Eurocentric knowledge was made
globally hegemonic through the workings of colonialism and capitalism. In
this manner, Western knowledge was considered universally salient—hence,
the idea of ‘universality’ of Eurocentric knowledge—while indigenous and
other colonized subjects’ knowledge was deemed to be provincial. 3 This
epistemological model, explains Quijano, works through establishing binary,
hierarchical relations such as primitive versus civilized, irrational versus
rational, and traditional versus modern such that everything that is ‘nonEuropean’ is identified with inferiority. The challenge for decoloniality is how

2

I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this clarification.
The word ‘indigenous’ here is used to describe a variety of Aboriginal peoples; hence, the
assumption is that the indigenous is not homogenous. By ‘indigenous knowledge’, then, I
do not mean to refer to a homogenous body of knowledge that is the antidote to the
Eurocentric. Rather, indigenous knowledge entails a variety of worldviews, skills, practices,
and rituals developed by societies with long histories of interaction with their surroundings
(Bruchac, 2014).
3
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to ‘delink’ knowledge production from the colonial matrix of power towards
different ways of knowing and being in the world (Mignolo, 2007). As
Mignolo explains:
Decoloniality, then, means working toward a vision of human life
that is not dependent upon or structured by the forced imposition of
one ideal of society over those that differ, which is what
modernity/coloniality does and, hence, where decolonization of the
mind should begin. The struggle is for changing the terms in
addition to the content of the conversation. (p. 459)
Recognizing the consequences of coloniality of knowledge and the need to
delink knowledge production from the colonial matrix of power highlights
that epistemic hierarchies are entangled with political, economic, and ethical
hierarchies. Therefore, a decolonial conceptualization of ethics constitutes an
inextricable part of decolonization, because it “offers more than an
alternative to Eurocentric ones” (De Lissovoy, 2010, p. 282). As De Lissovoy
argues, a decolonial ethics “exposes the several dimensions of a constitutive
contradiction and hypocrisy in the Western traditions of political and ethical
philosophy, and in the concrete projects of democracy-building that have
been informed by them” (p. 282). For example, the universalism that was
proclaimed for humanity was distorted, as it was imposed through deeply
racist and colonial discourses and practices such as the imposition of
‘civilizing missions’ and ‘developmentalist projects’ justified on the basis of
claims that these interventions would save the other from its own barbarism
(Grosfoguel, 2007).
To sum up, acknowledging the ethics of coloniality—as constitutive of
values about the superiority and universalization of Eurocentric knowledge,
the imposition of liberal values and the epistemicide of colonized subjects’
knowledge—raises questions about the extent to which this sort of ethics is
embedded in various academic disciplines and fields. In the next part of the
article, I will discuss how recent contributions in HRE and PE have begun to
problematize Eurocentric understandings of peace and human rights
theories and pedagogies. My goal is not to provide a comprehensive review of
this work, but rather to highlight the importance of paying attention to how
coloniality has had an influence on the ethical theories that have become
9

dominant in HRE and PE, namely, liberal, multiculturalist, and cosmopolitan
orientations. I will argue that if the reproduction of Western values and
Eurocentric knowledge production is going to be interrupted, then an
alternative, namely, a ‘decolonial ethics’ is required to be developed through
HRE and PE theories and pedagogies.
Eurocentric Understandings of Peace and Human Rights Theories
and Pedagogies
Recent work in both HRE and PE shows that many concepts in these
fields have been monopolized by Eurocentric scholarship. Take, for example,
the concept of ‘human rights’ itself and its grounding in liberal views of
modernity and specifically humanist notions of ‘the human’ as an
autonomous, rational, and sovereign ‘individual’ (Donnelly, 2003; Douzinas,
2000; Mutua, 2002). The very constitution of ‘human’ in human rights
discourses is predicated upon Eurocentric assumptions within which only
particular kinds of ethical subjects are recognizable as ‘human,’ while all
others are excluded through racialization and colonization (Mignolo, 2000;
Wynter, 2003). Pointing to the Eurocentric character of today’s
conceptualizations of human rights reveals their epistemological, ontological
and ethical grounding, which “is the offspring of a particular perspective
grounded in a historical and geographical context” (Barreto, 2012, p. 3).
Today’s conceptualizations of human rights, then, have colonizing functions
for those who have been, and still are, systematically excluded from its
imaginary (Khoja-Moolji, 2017).
In particular, liberal theories of politics and ethics—which often take
the form of moral cosmopolitan and multicultural views in human rights
discourses—are based on the idea that all human beings belong to the same
collectivity and should be treated equally regardless of their nationality,
language or religion (López, 2010). 4 The distinctive characteristics of

4

Needless to say, I do not reject all cosmopolitan and multicultural thought; my concern
here is that which is grounded in universalistic and individualistic frames (López, 2010). As
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cosmopolitanism, López points out, are individualism, universal equality,
and the generality of application, while multiculturalism emphasizes the
consideration and respect of difference. And yet, as the history of colonialism
shows, the ethico-political grounding of liberal theories is tied to the project
of coloniality and the reproduction of the colonial matrix of power. What
seems to be missing from liberal theories is how modernity and coloniality
have been responsible for the persistent coloniality and structural
inequalities in the world today (Dunford, 2017).
A similar argument has been made about HRE, namely, how the field
has been shaped within the epistemological, ontological and ethical
conditions of coloniality that have delimited its own space, both theoretically
and practically (Bajaj, Cislaghi & Mackie, 2016; Keet, 2015; Osler, 2015; Yang,
2015, Zembylas, 2017a, 2017b; Zembylas & Keet, 2019). Although there is a
range of perspectives in relation to HRE, it is generally understood as both a
field of study and an area of social education that is concerned with the
teaching and learning of human rights. The historical development of HRE
itself as a field has been linked to liberal, cosmopolitan and multicultural
perspectives that invoke the fundamental epistemological and ethical stance
of the West—that it can unilaterally know and determine the right and the
true for itself and all others through educational, political and cultural
interventions (Fregoso Bailón & De Lissovoy, 2018). For example, the
underlying assumption of many conventional HRE programs that primarily
promote knowledge about universal human rights is that learning about or
from universal human rights is a major way to secure ‘development’ and
‘emancipation’ in ‘developing’ countries; alternative conceptions from Africa
or other indigenous populations of what it means to be ‘human’ to live a
meaningful life —e.g. humanity in relational terms; the inclusion of
nonhumans in systems of living—are systematically undermined or
completely erased from these programs (Khoja-Moolji, 2017).

I show next in the article, the point is not to give up on cosmopolitan and multicultural
thought as such, but rather to develop such thinking within a frame of decolonial ethics.
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There is now growing evidence that conventional HRE projects in
schools, universities, non-governmental organisations and communities
seldom question the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the
Eurocentric theory of human rights (Keet, 2014), perpetuating an uncritical
advancement of human rights universals as an uncontested social good
(Keet, 2015). Building on Keet’s argument about the ‘imprisonment’ of human
rights and HRE into colonial and neoliberal arrangements (see also Coysh,
2014; Zembylas & Keet, 2019), I would go a step further and suggest that it is
time we questioned the ethical underpinnings of HRE as well, and
specifically how its liberal framework has limited the ethical promise of HRE
within a normative frame. But before I make an attempt to do so, it is
important to show how PE has followed a similar trajectory when it comes to
its embeddedness in Eurocentric ethical theories and pedagogies.
Similar to HRE, PE is defined as both a field of study and an area of
social education that is concerned with war, conflict and violence, and with
how to promote peace in the world (Burns & Aspeslagh, 1996; Harris &
Morrison, 2003; Salomon & Nevo, 2002). There are clearly overlaps between
HRE and PE in that the ideas of peace and human rights are often
interconnected when it comes to teaching and learning; they differ though in
terms of what they prioritize as their lens or focus of interest. Critiques of PE
theory and practice in recent years have also acknowledged how Eurocentric
ideas have influenced views on peacebuilding and peace education programs
(Bajaj, 2015; Bajaj & Brantmeier, 2011; Kester, 2019; Shirazi, 2011; Williams,
2013, 2016, 2017; Zakharia 2017; Zembylas, 2018). In particular, these critiques
highlight the limitations of the Eurocentric modernist framework
undergirding peace pedagogies and essentially the reproduction of
peacebuilding practices and institutions grounded in whiteness, coloniality
and liberalism. Similar to HRE, liberal theories in PE are reflected in the
epistemological, political and ontological premises of peace and peace
education (Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013, 2017).
Importantly, there are growing efforts in PE to utilize more explicitly
ideas from decolonial theory to discuss and analyze understandings and
practices of peace education. For example, Williams (2017) uses decolonial
thinking to discuss how colonialism and slavery need to inform more critical
12

ways forward in the work of peace education; this may take, for instance, the
form of questioning the colonial histories and iterations of structural
violence found in specific teaching and learning contexts in which ‘peace’ is
invoked. A similar argument has been put forward by Sumida Huaman (2011)
who makes a link between ‘critical peace education’ and ‘Indigenous
education’ by suggesting that it is important to recognize the legacies of
colonization in Indigenous societies and the need to include Indigenous
knowledges in nurturing transformative agencies toward critical peace
education. In my own recent work, I have also brought into conversation
‘postcolonial peace education’ with ‘critical peace education’, making an
attempt to theorize their convergences and divergences (Zembylas, 2018).
Other scholars’ efforts in peace education (e.g. Shirazi, 2011; Zakharia, 2017)
also explore the linkages between postcolonial theory and critical peace
education to articulate what it means for peace education to be inspired by
‘postcolonial’ ideas.5
Although these efforts do move away from the influence of
Eurocentric theorizing and engage explicitly with the ways in which
philosophical understandings and pedagogical practices of peace education
are implicated in modernity and coloniality, there is still considerable work
to be done to specify and unpack the ethical contours of decolonizing efforts
in PE. Clearly, work in ‘critical peace education’ has paid attention to issues
of structural inequalities and aims at cultivating a sense of ‘transformative
agency’ or ‘voice’ to create new social, epistemic and political structures that
advance peace and human rights. Yet, concepts such as agency or voice are

5

It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the variety of understandings and
definitions around ‘critical peace education,’ ‘postcolonial peace education’ and related
notions. It is sufficient here to say that what differentiates ‘conventional’ PE from critical
peace education is that the latter brings in theoretical frameworks and conceptual
resources that draw from fields such as critical pedagogy, social justice education, critical
race theory, and post-colonial and post-structural theory (e.g. see Bajaj, 2015; Bajaj &
Brantmeier, 2011; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos, 2016; Zembylas & Bekerman, 2013, 2017).
Postcolonial peace education highlights, in particular, how larger structural, material and
political realities of coloniality influence understandings and pedagogical practices of peace
(Zakharia, 2017; Zembylas, 2018).
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problematic as they feature strongly in colonial and universalist discourses.
Hence, a decolonial conceptualization of ethics is not yet reflected in
theorizations of critical peace education.
In particular, I would argue that it is important to develop a critical
decolonial ethics in both PE and HRE—that is, an ethics which is viewed as
part of decolonizing projects (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014). A critical decolonial
ethics in PE and HRE, then, would seek to develop decolonized accounts of
peace and human rights in which a new humanity could be made possible,
rather than being limited to a critique of modernity building on critical social
theories that are not calling for the total dismantling of Eurocentric
modernity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014). A decolonial PE, just as a decolonial
HRE, would emphasize the ongoing process of resistance (De Lissovoy, 2010)
to any colonial patterns of hierarchization and oppression in peacebuilding
and human rights efforts.
All in all, a decolonial perspective on ethics in HRE and PE poses
fundamental questions such as: How can the experience of the colonial
wound be acknowledged in HRE and PE accounts? What alternatives to
Eurocentric ethical theories may be developed in HRE and PE? How does a
decolonial perspective on ethics in HRE and PE radicalize liberal,
cosmopolitan, and multiculturalist considerations of difference? These
questions do not have simple answers, but rather highlight the significance
of explicit engagement with the ethical dimensions of coloniality in critiques
of HRE and PE.
Decolonial Ethics: Insights from Dussel, Wynter and MaldonadoTorres
This section explores the insights on decolonial ethics of three
prominent scholars who have addressed the issue of ethics more explicitly in
their writings: Enrique Dussel, Sylvia Wynter and Nelson Maldonado-Torres.
I focus on these scholars because they address issues that I find to be
pertinent in the fields of HRE and PE, namely, the idea of ethics of
materiality, positionality and corporality, the critique of ethical subjectivity
found in European epistemes, and the critique of the Eurocentric paradigm
14

of war. All of these issues come up, one way or another, in theorizations of
HRE and PE, although the sort of complexity invoked by these decolonial
thinkers is not yet widely reflected in discussions of coloniality,
hierarchization and marginalization in HRE and PE. My analysis here, then,
draws attention to these issues to expose the importance of the ethical in
attempts to decolonize HRE and PE.
In his long-standing work on the ethics of liberation, Dussel (1985,
2013) maintains that Western ethics are grounded in a disembodied and
metaphysical humanity that disregards materiality, positionality and
corporality. Therefore, he argues that corporality, positionality and
materiality should be reinstated by taking into consideration the
multidimensionality of life—e.g. cultural values, biological factors, material
factors etc.—and how each of these dimensions implies ethical obligations.
As López (2010) observes, Dussel develops a critique of Western ethics by
departing from the abstract modern moralism of Kant and moving toward an
ethics that takes seriously the materiality of human life: “He [Dussel]
maintains that an ethics that attempts to deal with evidently factual matters
such as misery and the conditions of those excluded from the global order
necessarily requires the primacy of a material order” (p. 666).
In other words, confronting the materiality of coloniality demands a
decolonial ethics that positions the others (e.g. the poor, the oppressed) in
practical-material terms; that is, the ethical responsibility to confront the
affective and material consequences of coloniality (e.g. see Pedwell, 2016) is
foregrounded. As Dussel explains, the true ethical response is not an issue of
applying an ideal ethical system that dictates how one ought to act, but
rather it is formulated on the basis of the other’s affective and material
experiences and assessments of political conditions:
Others reveal themselves as others in all the acuteness of their
exteriority when they burst in upon us as something extremely distinct, as
nonhabitual, nonroutine, as the extraordinary, the enormous (“apart from
the norm”)—the poor, the oppressed. They are the ones who, by the side of
the road, outside the system, show their suffering, challenging faces: “We’re
hungry! We have the right to eat” (1985, p. 43).
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The ethical moment is the cry that people ought not to be poor and
oppressed; the materiality, positionality and corporality of this moment is
precisely what disturbs the world and its colonial organization and
reconceptualizes life on the basis of the gaze of the other. Importantly, the
ethics of materiality, positionality and corporality extends well beyond
particular persons encountering each other to encompass the social,
historical and physical environment (De Lissovoy, 2018).
Like Dussel, Sylvia Wynter emerges as another unrelenting critic of
the Eurocentric ethical foundations by focusing specifically on one figure—
white European ‘Man’ as a rational, masterful and civilized being—and how
he has monopolized the human (Odysseos, 2017). Wynter (2003; Wynter &
McKittrick, 2015) highlights how the organization of colonial discourses and
practices entailed the assumption of human as a single homogenized being
based on the figure of the West’s liberal Man. For Wynter (2003), Man
emerged through ‘genres’ that occurred through historical ruptures in
European history—e.g. the homo politicus Man of the Enlightenment in the
eighteenth century or the homo economicus Man of capitalism in the
nineteenth century. Her genealogy of genres of Man shows how knowledge
systems, values and ethics are embodied and historically situated. However,
these ethical principles (e.g. White rationality, Christian principles of
spirituality, etc.) have become normalized, while other ethics (e.g.
Indigenous populations) have been undermined or excluded from the
prevailing genre of the human.6
For Wynter, challenging the overrepresented figure of Man is “central
to ethical inquiry and subjectivity, in situ at the multiple sites of
contemporary coloniality” (Odysseos, 2017, p. 458). In other words, Wynter’s
interrogation of the ethics of Man is not an intellectual matter but rather
“one of social, political and ethical-relational importance for ongoing projects

6

As noted earlier, Indigenous populations are not homogeneous in their religion or even
value systems. It’s the imposition of this unified / universal values that is problematic.
Once again, I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this
clarification.
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of decolonization” (Odysseos, 2017, p. 458) In her efforts to decenter Man
and the grounding of his ethical subjectivity, Wynter invokes a new notion of
humanness that is articulated as a collective body and praxis rather than an
individual autonomous entity as found in European epistemes: As McKittrick
(2015) explains: “Being human [for Wynter] signals not a noun but a verb.
Being human is a praxis of humanness” (p. 3). It is important to show how
human selves are multifarious and are enacted differently in various
(colonized) contexts; therefore, an important part of developing decolonial
ethics, Wynter tells us, ought to be the de-generalization of the Man and his
universal ethics.
Finally, I turn to decolonial theorist Maldonado-Torres and his
ground-breaking book Against War: View from the Underside of Modernity
(2008) in which he articulates critical decolonial ethics in relation to the
paradigm of war and racism that is inextricably tied to coloniality. A
paradigm of war is defined by Maldonado-Torres as “a way of conceiving
humanity, knowledge, and social relations that privileges conflict or polemos”
(p. 3). This paradigm is genealogically traceable to the emergence of
Eurocentric modernity in 1492, which is interpreted as paradigmatic of the
birth of a world capitalist economy, the colonial exploitation by Europe, and
the use of violence to impose a modern subjectivity based on race as an
organizing principle. Decolonial ethics, then, is opposed to this world system
and the ethics it invokes: racially hierarchized, capitalist, patriarchal, sexist,
Eurocentric, Christian-centric, and colonial (Grosfoguel, 2007). The
decolonial turn, according to Maldonado-Torres (2008),
posits the primacy of ethics as an antidote to problems with Western
conceptions of freedom, autonomy and equality, as well as the
necessity of politics to forge a world where ethical relations become
the norm rather than the exception. The de-colonial turn highlights
the epistemic relevance of the enslaved and colonized search for
humanity. (p. 7)
According to Maldonado-Torres, the post-1492 modern world-system was
driven by war, and at its center was Eurocentrism and coloniality. What
critical decolonial ethics seeks is, therefore, a paradigm of peace, yet not one
that superficially extols peace for the sake of it, but one “that is constitutive
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of decolonial liberatory ethics [and] marks a radical humanistic-oriented
departure from the paradigm of war” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014, p. 910). If we
are going to overcome what Maldonado-Torres (2008) calls the ‘master
morality’ premised on the refusal to engage the colonized person as ethical
being and defines non-white bodies as sub-human, then we clearly need to
develop a decolonial ethics outside of Western ethics and politics.
To sum up, the elements that each decolonial thinker adds—i.e. an
ethics of materiality, positionality and corporality, the critique of ethical
subjectivity found in European epistemes, and the critique of the Eurocentric
paradigm of war —contribute toward a decolonial ethics that aims at
rehumanizing people who have been reduced by racism and colonialism to
the ‘wretched of the earth’ (Fanon, 1963). Given that coloniality has been
imposed on notions of universality, it might be tempting to think that
decolonial ethics would reject any global design of ethics “on the basis that it
will inevitably crush differences and reinforce coloniality” (Dunford, 2017, p.
387). Indeed, as De Lissovoy (2010) also points out, there are serious
concerns, when claims are made about a global decolonial ethics. Such
concerns emerge from the fact that notions of unity and commonality in
ethical projects “have been infected by the assimilative impulse of
Eurocentrism” and so it may be argued that “any truly global ethics [of
decoloniality] will have to break with the epistemologically predatory
determinations of [Eurocentrism]” (De Lissovoy, 2010, p. 283). However,
argues De Lissovoy, to reject a global decolonial ethics altogether “is only to
recoil into the obverse of a colonial universalism” (p. 283). Similarly, Dunford
(2017) suggests that challenging the colonial matrix of power and developing
a decolonial ethics constitutes a global project, in the sense “that decolonial
ethics is and must be globally minded” (p. 387). The difference is that such a
globally minded ethics has to be built outside of Western traditions and
should be an ongoing and provisional product of dialogue and collaboration
between differences rather than an a priori set of European ethical values (De
Lissovoy, 2010), no matter how ‘noble’ they sound such as liberal,
multicultural or cosmopolitan values.
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Toward a Decolonial Ethics in HRE and PE
In this last section of the article, I explore how the decolonial
reflections on ethics outlined so far may sketch a different trajectory in HRE
and PE—one that moves beyond familiar ethical theories of liberal,
multiculturalist, and cosmopolitan orientations. In particular, I will focus on
three ideas that invoke new forms of HRE and PE as ethical and incessant
decolonial projects: border thinking, being human as praxis, and
pluriversality. These ideas are inspired by the insights discussed from the
work of Dussel, Wynter and Maldonado-Torres. Once again, these ideas are
not meant to be exhaustive or even exemplary of a decolonial global ethics in
HRE and PE, but rather as illustrative of the ethical possibilities that are
opened for scholarship in these fields.
Border Thinking
As noted earlier, liberal, multiculturalist, and cosmopolitan theories
promote thinking in abstract universalist terms, while ignoring the
positionality and contribution of the poor and the marginalized (Dunford,
2017). On the contrary, decolonial scholars invoke thinking from the border
to highlight the contributions of subaltern knowledge producers, who are in
the margins, yet whose positions are legitimate to be heard (MaldonadoTorres, 2008). As Maldonado-Torres writes, these positions must be taken
into consideration not because they have equal value in the name of an
abstract cosmopolitanism, “but because the centuries old experience of
coloniality and dehumanization provides colonized subjects with important
perspectives” (p. 250). Border thinking, then, does not assume that those
positions will remain at the border and margins. It means that those
positions are reacting to the dominant Eurocentric discourse, rather than
being the core and leading the way forward to decoloniality. Also, it is not
only the positions that are brought in, but also the experiences of struggle
and praxis.
Thinking from the borders in HRE and PE involves giving up the
supremacy of liberal, multicultural or cosmopolitan ethics embedded in
these fields and taking an active stance against colonial patterns of
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hierarchization and oppression in peacebuilding and human rights efforts.
For example, to think from the borders implies decolonizing HRE and PE
interventions so that the histories and experiences of colonized people are
included and active engagement with subjugated knowledges is invoked—
e.g. the recognition of colonized people’s experiences of peace and war (see
Zakharia, 2017). Developing a decolonial ethics in HRE and PE means making
subjugated knowledges key points at the levels of pedagogy, curriculum
programs, and teacher education, while rejecting Eurocentric supremacy in
determining what legitimate knowledge is.
Furthermore, to think from the borders is not only to acknowledge
the experience of the colonial wound in HRE and PE accounts, but also to
think with these experiences of coloniality and dehumanization when
developing contextualized HRE and PE programs. This means that decolonial
ethics radicalizes liberal, cosmopolitan, and multiculturalist considerations
of difference embedded in HRE and PE programs, because it offers different
understandings of what is of fundamental moral significance. There are for
instance, indigenous cultures that do not prioritize the ‘rights’ and moral
worth of human beings as compared to other beings. Some of the moral
visions that operate at the borders, then, refuse to specify in advance that
some beings are more worthy than others (Dunford, 2017). The recognition of
indigenous’ understandings and experiences of ‘rights’ in HRE provides an
alternative vision of ethics.
Being Human as Praxis
As noted earlier, Wynter’s (2013; Wynter & McKittrick, 2015) notion of
‘being human as praxis’ “renews the question of ethics and shows that the
modern colonial stabilization of knowledge about who we are as human
cannot function as a foundation for a revisioned humanism or for decolonial
ethics” (Odysseos, 2017, p. 458). De-generalizing the figure of Man through
the development of a decolonizing HRE and PE would entail efforts towards
new forms of education that raise, much like decolonial ethics, fundamental
questions anew such as “what do we ‘teach’, how do we educate, in what
languages, and in what systemic conditions? Moreover, how politically do we
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challenge knowledge orders that continue to do epistemic, and legitimate
actual, violence?” (Odysseos, 2017, p. 466). In this sense, forms of education
such as HRE and PE may be thought of as ‘unfinished’ projects that are
“inextricably connected to specific struggles of epistemic justice” (Odysseos,
2017, p. 466).
In other words, struggles towards epistemic justice in HRE and PE are
embedded in larger projects of decolonization; this implies that to promote
global social justice, we will also need to begin interrogating the construction
of epistemic injustice in all educational contexts, theories, policies and
pedagogical practices (Zembylas, 2017b). If Wynter’s work on human as
praxis teaches us anything, argues Odysseos (2017), it is that grasping the
multiplicity of humanity, as manifested in different contexts, can only result
in the dissolution of disciplinary boundaries and an obsolescence of the
disciplines as narrowly conceived in Eurocentric domains of knowledge (p.
469). To put this simply: HRE and PE need to cease to exist as Eurocentric
disciplines and dissolve the disciplinary boundaries, and begin to employ
practices of knowledge and language that seek to develop radical and
transgressive praxis, which sees the world as relation rather than in
individualist terms.
The ‘renewal’ of HRE and PE, then, is inextricably linked to
knowledge-production and cultivation as participation in practices that aim
to make possible and viable the existence of new ethical relations with others
(humans and non-humans alike) and engage in ongoing struggles for
decolonization. HRE and PE as knowledge practices are not isolated from
decolonization efforts; on the contrary, to insist on renewing these fields,
academically, ethically, politically, and practically means radical institutional,
epistemic and ethical reforms that erase existing colonial remnants of
knowledge in all manifestations of what is called HRE and PE. To enable this
radical renewal of HRE and PE, then, our conceptualizations of ‘human
rights’ and ‘peace’ as Western conceptions need to abandon their claim to
universality and should be replaced by pluriversality.
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Pluriversality
Pluriversality means recognizing that there are pluriversal values, that
is, values which emerge from dialogue across multiple places, cultures and
visions about the world (Dussel, 2013; Mignolo, 2011). There are overlaps and
distinctions between border thinking and pluriversality, however, they are
complementary ideas. While the former focuses on the notion of taking
seriously as producers of knowledge those shunned by coloniality, the latter
turns our attention to a different process of knowledge production that
overcomes epistemic coloniality. Both of these ideas though overlap when it
comes to valuing “a world in which other worlds are possible […] a world in
which multiple cosmovisions, worldviews, practices and livelihoods co-exist”
(Dunford, 2017, pp. 380-381). In particular, pluriversality’s focus on dialogue,
explains Dunford, involves all forms of communication (e.g. argumentation,
discussion, performance, ceremony) and if conducted with respect, then it
can foster commonality and values that have global significance “not by
virtue of an already-existing universality that can be articulated from one
particular place, but on the basis of resonances amongst, translation across
and the construction of common understandings amongst multiple
positions” (p. 390). For example, Mignolo (2011) has talked about the need to
pluriversalize human rights, namely, to recognize that there are plural
principles of human rights across all cultures rather than only the Western
ones. That Western epistemology appears universalistic compared to
epistemologies of the South is because Western conceptions of human rights
are part of the imperial and colonial project. Respectful intercultural
translation across cultures that have different understandings and
experiences of ‘human rights’ can be used as valuable tools to develop a
critical and interpretative approach to HRE that could pluriversalise human
rights (Zembylas, 2017b). To pluriversalize human rights, human rights need
to be historicized, that is, the history of rights has to extend to other
geographies and historical thinkers who approach rights from perspectives
beyond Europe (i.e. Third World, South, indigenous).
Furthermore, pluriversalizing HRE and PE means turning the process
of knowledge production in these fields open to epistemic diversity. A
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pluriversal HRE or PE, therefore, is conceived as a process of advancing
epistemic justice by delinking human rights teaching or peace pedagogies
from Eurocentrism; similar to border thinking, pluriversalizing HRE and PE
recognizes and includes forms of knowledge that have been subjugated by
modernity and coloniality. To advance epistemic justice, HRE and PE need to
excavate and surface the counter-histories of erasures and dehumanizations.
Epistemic justice is advanced from contesting ethical theories in HRE and PE
that are taken for granted, while acknowledging in the process the material
and symbolic negations and losses as a result of colonialism and
contemporary forms of dispossession, domination and epistemicide
grounded in the daily life (cf. Dussel, 2013).
Needless to say, developing a decolonial ethics—in HRE, PE or
elsewhere—that is grounded in pluriversality is not without its risks and
tensions. For example, Dunford (2017) wonders whether ‘inter-cultural
dialogue’ has limits and constraints7:
Are values justified solely by virtue of having emerged through intercultural dialogue, or is it possible for a value to be wrong,
normatively speaking, despite emerging from this process? Are any
and all views allowed to the table, or ought certain views be rejected?
What about those views that reproduce colonial narratives or values
that have done so much to silence, undermine and oppress those on
the underside of the colonial matrix of power? (Dunford, 2017, p. 391)
As Dunford suggests, without any reflection on the emergence of
pluriversality within specific contexts that examine the compatibility of
practices, worldviews, values or policies, then there is a risk to turn
pluriversality into another abstract, universal principle that would
undermine all producers of knowledge, especially those who are
marginalized.

7

‘Intercultural dialogue’ is a concept championed by the Council of Europe and other
intergovernmental organizations and many programs are created around this concept for
young people and different communities; however, all of these initiatives often fail to
tackle issues of coloniality, oppression, race, power and so on. This is similar to
coexistence, peace and other concepts that often gloss over all the colonial manifestations.
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A major tension emerging from attempts to develop a decolonial
ethics in HRE and PE, then, according to Dunford (2017) is whether
decoloniality is an option or an imperative. For Mignolo (2011), decoloniality
is an option, otherwise it would be incompatible with decolonial ethics, as it
would amount to replacing one hegemonic discourse (Western values) with
another. As he explains: “The decolonial option is not aiming to be the one. It
is just an option that, beyond asserting itself as such, makes clear that all the
rest are also options” (p. 21). This implies that liberal, multicultural and
cosmopolitan ethical theories are not rejected, as long as they are also
presented as options rather than imperatives.
On the other hand, if decolonial ethics is to provide an alternative
that truly dismantles the colonial matrix of power, then it is argued that it
must be an imperative (Dunford, 2017). Far from settling the issue here, my
point is that this tension needs to be seriously considered, especially its
repercussions, whenever an argument is made about decolonizing HRE and
PE. Reflecting on the ethos of decolonizing HRE and PE requires addressing
the vital question of how scholars in these fields might actually practice the
disruptive, decolonial HRE and PE in ways that align with decolonial ethics.
Advocating for the pluriversalisation of HRE and PE, then, has important
implications for disciplinary formations and knowledge production,
including the production of ethical and decolonial theorizing in these fields
(cf. Odysseos, 2017, p. 471). As calls for decolonization grow in various
academic fields, “we may choose to refuse these; or we might decide to
strategically engage in the sort of pluralization of knowledge” (Odysseos,
2017, p. 471) discussed above, as part of a broader attempt to elaborate a
decolonial HRE or PE on the basis of decolonial ethics or decolonial
approaches to race, power, and knowledge.
Conclusion
Decolonial thinking is increasingly serving as a resource for HRE and
PE scholars seeking ways to interrogate and disrupt Eurocentric knowledge
production in these fields. This article has suggested that an important task
in these efforts is the development of decolonial ethics. In particular, the
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article has discussed some elements of a future decolonial ethics in HRE and
PE, while showing the limits of familiar ethical theories, namely, liberal,
multiculturalist, and cosmopolitan ones. In light of the work of Dussel,
Wynter and Maldonado-Torres on decolonial ethics, the analysis has
attempted to sketch a different path in HRE and PE from the familiar ethical
theories along three important directions: border thinking, being human as
praxis, and pluriversality.
Taking decolonial ethics seriously creates openings for further work in
HRE and PE to continue ongoing attempts that challenge and transform the
coloniality of academic, institutions, disciplines and structures. The three
directions outlined here help raise questions about whether, how and why
policies, practices, programs, curricula, and theories in HRE and PE truly
promote epistemic justice. Insisting, then, on questions of decolonial ethics
illuminates not only the ethico-political elements of HRE and PE, but also
the prospects of invoking transformative praxis in these fields.
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